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ABSTRACT 
Cyber phishing is a theft of personal information in which phishers, also known 
as attackers, lure users to surrender sensitive data such as credentials, credit card and 
bank account information, financial details, and other behavioral data. The ones who 
commit such crimes are called ‘Phishers’ or ‘Attackers.’ Phishers act as if they are 
reliable sources to lure users to gain access/control to their system. Phishing detection 
is becoming a crucial research area, attracting increased focus as the number of phishing 
attacks grows, since e-commerce and internet transactions are growing rapidly.  
Furthermore, because phishers are innovating various techniques, phishing 
detection has become a primary concern of developers. Moreover, as long as phishers 
are innovating their schemes, researchers have no way except to tackle every possible 
detection technique. Detection mechanisms come along with a vast variety of 
techniques since no one can be sure which techniques phishers are trying to come up 
with. Therefore, it is still an interesting yet challenging issue. 
We focus on URL (Uniform Resource Locator) -based phishing detection 
techniques since URL is a significant criterium in preventing phishing attacks without 
accessing to webpage directly. Hypothesis is that phishers create fake websites with 
less content information on the webpage as possible – showing only a few words in the 
webpage. When phishers rarely show content information in a webpage, we cannot 
retrieve enough features from the webpage by using detection approaches such as 
content and visual similarity-based. To overcome the limitation of those approaches, 
we focus on URL-based detection since we can extract features by analyzing URLs 
only, without accessing to the webpage.  
Since previous works extract features of specific special characters, we assume 
that non-alphanumeric (NAN) characters distribution highly impact phishing URLs. 
Our contribution is to propose a new feature called entropy of NAN characters and 
compare with the previously used features, which are from previous researches. To be 
noted, those previous features are not from only one specific work but are applied on 
several works. We also emphasize on features engineering because selecting features 
(NAN characters in our work) affects the most on performance. As it is difficult to 
gather exactly same datasets used by previous works, we work on our datasets and 
compare with our contributed feature. We work on two datasets (balanced and 
imbalanced) and perform feature selection and hyperparameter tuning. We achieved 
96% of ROC_AUC with balanced dataset and 89% with imbalanced dataset, which 
outperforms 87% in balanced and  84% in imbalanced datasets, respectively. Then, we 
summarize our findings and suggestions for better outcome of phishing detection.  
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CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION 
Cyber phishing is no longer an unfamiliar topic since the Internet became an 
essential daily basis. People can do almost everything staying at home and sitting in 
front of  their PCs – from groceries shopping to health support services. It was reported 
that the number of internet users significantly increased from nearly 0.15 billion in 1998 
to 4.32 billion in 2018, which is a growth of approximately 30 times [1]. This indicates 
that people strongly depend on internet on daily basis. At the same time, enormous 
amount of information makes some people allured to steal information to access to a 
system and committing crimes. To analyze the reason of crimes, phishers commit not 
only for money, but for fame, acknowledgement or out of curiosity. Thus, phishing 
detection draw attention from researchers.  
1.1. What is Phishing? 
Phishing is a cyber threat in which attackers take advantage of users by 
mimicking legitimate authentic websites in order to steal sensitive information such 
as passwords and bank statements. Phishing is performed through different 
mediums: internet, short message service and voice. Their targeted vectors can be 
email, instant messaging, smishing (short message phishing), vishing (voice 
phishing) and websites [2]. In our research, phishing refers to web phishing through 
the Internet. Although phishing can be protected against by: (1) user awareness, and 
(2) technology-based approaches, the former cannot be completely trusted since it 
relies on humans–not all of whom are aware of phishing. 
1.2. Overview of URL-based Phishing Techniques 
URL-based phishing attacks are mainly performed by embedding sensitive words 
or characters in a link that: 
• Mimic similar but misspelled words. 
• Contain special characters for redirecting. 
• Use shortened URLs. 
• Use sensitive keywords which seem reliable. 
• Add a malicious file in the link and so on. 
1.3. Problem Statement 
Anti-Phishing Working Group (APWG) [3] addressed that the total number of 
unique phishing websites detected is approximately 785,000 in 2018, which is a 
significant number in the area. They also said that use of web page redirects to hide 
actual phishing sites to make victims misunderstand as legitimate sites has increased. 
When potential victims click on the links, they are redirected to phishing sites via 
several numbers of intermediate sites. Then, phishers request for credential information 
or install malware in the victims’ computer. “This obfuscation technique is an effort by 
the phishers to hide the phishing URL – most notably from detection via web server log 
referrer field monitoring,” said Stefanie Ellis, Anti-Fraud Product Marketing Manager 
at MarkMonitor [4]. 
Moreover, according to PhishLabs [5], HTTPS phishing sites became popular in 
the past two years ago. At the end of 2016, there were less than 5% of phishing sites 
found on HTTPS infrastructure. Later in Q4 of 2017, it raised up to 33%. Phishers target 
users’ poor awareness of green lock  , acting as if it is secured. Actually, the 
 
 
 2 
green lock only shows that it uses SSL certificates, but not the security of the site. In 
addition, phishers mimic websites which are similar to legitimate ones, without 
providing much information on the content, which are later analyzed by researchers for 
detection purpose. They hide suspicious information as less as possible to lure users.  
To sum up, we can conclude the problem statement as follow: 
o Users being tricked by URLs based on users’ lack of knowledge 
o Showing information of a webpage’s content as less as possible 
1.4. Motivation 
Regarding the problem statements mentioned above, we need a detection scheme 
which 1) alerts users before clicking the link and 2) classifies phishing or not by 
analyzing URLs, before accessing their content themselves. Thus, we assume that 
detecting phishing URLs can be effective even in which there is no or less content 
information on a webpage, compared to other approaches such as content and visual 
similarity-based. According to [3, 5], we notice that phishers have an increasing interest 
in URL-based attacks to gather sensitive information. Moreover, URL-based phishing 
detection can reduce unnecessary access to the phishing page, compared to other 
approaches such as blacklisted websites used in google safe browsing, content and visual 
similarity. Thus, although there are a wide range of phishing detection schemes such as 
blacklist-based detection, whitelist-based detection, content-based detection and visual 
similarity-based detection, we emphasize URL-based phishing detection in our research. 
Previous URL-based phishing detection such as [7, 8] have used feature such as URL 
length,  which could be manipulated by phishers and also bias to the dataset when we 
do not have path information of a URL for legitimate websites –Alexa’s top 1M dataset 
provide domain names only, and Alexa ranking – free hosting services 
(000webhost.com) ranked high in Alexa which are also used by phishers. [7] performed 
feature extraction of specific special characters (such as ‘.’ ‘-’ ‘=’ ‘_’ ‘?’ ‘/’). Thus, we 
assume that distribution of NAN characters effects on  phishing detection and propose 
entropy calculation of NAN as an important feature.  
1.5. Contribution 
Because of the problems of Alexa-ranking feature and URL length feature, in our 
work, we do not deploy these features. According to [7, 8], we assume that participation 
of NAN characters greatly affects phishing detection because phishers create fake 
URLs with NAN characters such as : 
1) extra unnecessary dots,  
2) ‘//’ to redirect to a completely different domain,  
3) ‘-‘ in the domain to mimic similar, yet different website 
4) unnecessary symbols   
However, instead of directly using the frequencies of NAN characters found in 
URL, we propose a new feature to compute distribution of special characters. Our 
contribution is to propose  a new feature called entropy of non-alphanumeric characters 
(NAN) for phishing detection only by analyzing their URLs. 
Although we know that 12 features in total in our system is not sufficient in the 
real-world system, our objective is to confirm how effective our proposed entropy of 
NAN is in the system. We contribute a new feature which is useful in URL-based 
phishing detection whenever less or no information is available in phishing websites. 
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1.6. Thesis Organization 
Our thesis is organized as introduction in chapter 1 with its problem statement 
and motivation. Related work including phishing detection architecture in chapter 2, 
and then in chapter 3, we present our phishing detection system, machine learning 
methods as building blocks, feature selection method applied in our work. Then, we 
describe the dataset we work on and feature selection and extraction with detailed 
explanation in chapter 4 and later, our experimental evaluations and summary on 
chapter 5. Eventually, we conclude our thesis in chapter 6. 
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CHAPTER 2 
RELATED WORK 
2.1. Overview of Phishing Detection Architecture 
Although there are various medium and vector to be categorized for phishing – 
internet as medium, email or instant messaging as vector and social engineering as 
technical approach [2], we can mainly classify the attacks into two according to social 
engineering perspective [6]: fake websites (Figure. 2.1 (a) – compromised domain) and 
email spoofing (Figure. 2.1 (b) – via email). 
 
 
Figure 2.1. Email Spoofing (a) Fake Website (b) 
 
We survey phishing detection approaches for better understand how it works. 
Phishing detection schemes are categorized differently in various papers[9,10,11,12]. 
Thus, we categorize them in general as shown in Figure 2.2. 
 
 
Figure 2.2. Phishing Detection Schemes 
 
To explain briefly, whitelist and blacklist schemes use its periodically updated 
database. Whitelist saves login information and alerts users if abnormal login happens 
while the latter checks if current URL is in periodically updated blacklisted data (e.g. 
Google Safe Browsing). Content based detection comes with several techniques such 
as text mining (e.g. keyword extraction and search engine), html and JavaScript analysis 
(e.g. login form or iframe detection) and so on. Meanwhile, visual similarity scheme 
solely extracts signatures of webpages for detection. URL-based detection consists of 
mining keywords in URL for target domain, domain-based detection or hybrid 
detection (keywords extraction from domain and content). 
2.2. Whitelist-based approach 
Kang et al. [13] proposed an approach based on white-listed sites in 2007. They 
performed a URL similarity check to distinguish phishing sites from otherwise for local 
pharming– changing host file in the local computer and a mechanism comparing with 
Domain Name System (DNS) query to overcome DNS pharming attacks which is DNS 
record of the URL has been spoofed – i.e. problem for relying on DNS from previous 
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works. Although whitelist-based methods seem effective for phishing detection, there 
is a limitation on obtaining all legitimate sites on the web. An abundant list of reliable 
websites is necessary for a robust system with high accuracy; otherwise, false positive 
rates increase due to a lack of white-listed websites information, which is practically 
impossible to collect all legitimate sites in the world.  
In 2008, Cao et al. [14] also presented an automated individual whitelist approach 
(AIWL), in which the system maintains a user’s previous login and warns when 
unfamiliar access has occurred. They proposed trusted Login User Interfaces (LUIs) 
features. It stored legitimate website list where users submitted sensitive information. 
Their system alarms users whenever sensitive information is sent to any webpage that 
are not in their list. However, AIWL warns an alert whenever any information is sent 
to any other page in the list although the page is genuine. 
 
 
Figure 2.3. Whitelist-based detection 
 
2.3. Blacklist-based approach 
Web browsers – such as Google Safe Browsing [15] – defend against phishing 
attacks by updating a list of black-listed sites. It uses user application to verify whether 
a given URL is blacklisted. Currently, it implements two blacklist services ‘goog-phish-
shavar’ (phishing) and ‘googmalware-shavar’ (malware).  
In 2008, Sharifi et al. [16] proposed a new blacklist generator technique to solve 
the common issues of maintaining an up-to-date list.  
PhishNet [17] also predicts phishing attacks based on a blacklist scheme. It solves 
the problem of exact matching. It uses five heuristics – top level domain, IP address, 
directory structure, query string and brand name– for combinations of blacklists to 
predict new phishing sites. Although it cannot detect zero hour phishing sites – newly 
created phishing sites, it achieves 95% true positive rate and 3% false positive (FP) rate 
over large datasets.  
Generally, blacklist approach has lower FP rate than heuristic approaches. 
 
 
Figure 2.4. Blacklist-based detection 
 
Since blacklist-based system relies on third-party services (like Google) for 
searching domain name to compare top results, it results in poor performance. 
Furthermore, blacklist approaches encounter the major issue of zero hour phishing 
attacks because newly created phishing sites are not in the list, although services such 
as Google Safe Browsing use periodically updated blacklist. Google Safe Browsing 
[15] also fails to detect phishing if blacklisted domain’s IP address is changed. 
PhishNet[17] has a problem that if a URL is a slightly changed version of blacklisted 
one, it remains undetected. 
 
 
 6 
2.4. Content-based/Heuristic-based approach 
SpoofGuard [18] is a browser plug-in for Internet Explorer (IE) using a set of 
heuristics for anomalies detection in a webpage. It checks if the given URL is similar 
to whitelisted URLs and also detects if a hidden attribute – text attribute is different 
from actual one, is present. It cannot detect if URLs are not defined properly according 
to its rules. 
PhishGuard [19] – also a browser plug-in – performs detection based on HTTP 
authentication. It sends same user ID, but different random passwords. If the response 
is HTTP 200, it detects as phishing. PhishGuard [19] leads to credential theft if the 
websites reply unauthorized. 
Zhang et al. [20] presented a novel approach, so-called CANTINA in 2007. Their 
work is based on Term Frequency – Inverse Document Frequency (TF-IDF) 
information retrieval algorithm used to detect phishing websites. CANTINA alone 
resulted in a high false positive rate due to limitations on the number of search engine 
results. It caught 97% phishing sites with 6% false positive rates, which is not optimal. 
Thus, they used several heuristics to reduce the false positive rate and improve accuracy. 
Their approach achieved a better outcome compared to popular anti-phishing toolbars, 
achieving 90% of phishing sites detected with only 1% false positive rate.  
In 2011, Xiang et al. [21] further improved CANTINA, calling it CANTINA+, 
which is regarded as the most comprehensive feature-rich approach in content-based 
phishing detection. It achieved a better 0.4% false positive rate with 10% training phish 
and over 92% true positive rate on unique testing phish.  
Since both CANTINA and CANTINA use search engines and third-party services, 
DNS compromising became a challenging threat.  
Moghimi et al.[22] in 2016 proposed a rule-based method to detect phishing 
internet banking by extracting two feature sets from the content of webpage; page 
resource access protocol feature set and page resource identity feature set. They used 
approximate string matching algorithms to determine the relationship between the 
content and the URL of a webpage. They achieved accuracy of 99.14% TP and 0.86% 
FN. However, their system completely depends on the webpage content. If phishers use 
efforts and redesign the page, then it will lead to high FP rate. Moreover, their features 
are extracted by tracing DOM. Thus, if phishers use flash media or image of legitimate 
webpage instead, they cannot classify correctly. 
Similar works can be found in [23-25]. 
 
 
Figure 2.5. Content-based detection 
 
2.5. Visual Similarity-based approach 
Wenyin et al. [26] proposed a simple visual-similarity-based approach in 2005. 
Their system performed phishing detection on three levels of similarity matrices; (i) 
block level similarity, (ii) layout-similarity and (iii) overall-style similarity. However, 
the most representative work on visual similarity was later presented by Fu et al. [27] 
in 2006 using the Earth Mover Distance (EMD). EMD was used to calculate the 
signatures of two images for visual similarity. Their method performed well in accuracy 
with 89% true positive and 0.71% false positive rates. The significant workload 
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required to process two images has a performance drawback compared to other 
approaches. 
Chen et al. [28] introduced a heuristic anti-phishing system to model perceptual 
similarity. They employed a logistic regression algorithm for normalizing page content 
features. Although the proposed method achieved 100% true positive rate, it had 0.74% 
false positive rate, which is higher than [27]. There are many similar works based on 
visual similarity including [29-39]. 
 
 
Figure 2.6. Visual similarity-based detection 
 
2.6. URL-based approach 
Aburrous et al. [40] proposed an intelligent phishing detection system for e-
banking using fuzzy data mining in 2010. The experiment was performed based on 
fuzzy logic with data mining algorithms. They showed how effective URL-based 
approaches are for phishing detection.  
Yuan et al. [8] in 2018 proposed to extract features from URLs and webpage links. 
Their work is based on hybrid approach (consist of both URL-based features and 
content-based features). However, they performed statistical (such as mean, median 
between features) based on URLs along with lexical features (such as title and textual 
content). They achieved 98.3% of TP and 2.6% of FP, however, the datasets are 
relatively small i.e. 3305 legitimate and 2892 phishing websites are used. Furthermore, 
they used URL length feature and Alexa ranking feature, in which URL length feature 
can be manipulated by phishers and Alexa ranking feature ranks free hosting domain 
such as 000webhost.com, which are commonly used by phishers.   
In general, although URL-based schemes perform well without knowing content 
information of webpage, they highly depend on feature extraction. Furthermore, 
performance can vary depending on which features we apply. Thus, selecting features 
matters in URL-based detection.  
Overall, URL-based methods perform faster than any other approaches, including 
content and visual similarity-based approaches. More importantly, they work well on 
zero hour phishing attacks, which are becoming a major concern in modern anti-
phishing society. In upcoming sections, we further discuss details of URL-based 
detection. 
2.7. Other approaches 
A variety of alternative techniques are used by researchers in phishing detection. 
Such techniques include heuristic [41], hybrid [42], machine learning [43], DNS-based 
and others [44]. Additionally, several surveys regarding different schemes are 
performed by researchers [45-46].  
We listed some of the phishing detection approaches and limitations in Table 2.1. 
Table 2.1. Phishing Detection Approaches 
Approach Solution Pros Limitation/Remark 
WhiteList  
(AIWL)[14] 
• Maintain own 
individual whitelist 
• Alert users for possible 
attack if credential to 
• Perform well on  
detection (LUI 
authentication) by 
storing entire LUI 
• Warn whenever any information is 
sent to any other trusted page, that are 
not in the whitelist since AILW 
maintains previous successful LUI of 
websites 
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Login User Interface 
(LUI) not in the white-
list is submitted. 
information rather than 
only URL. 
• Efficiently defend 
pharming attacks by 
alerting users when 
legitimate IP address is 
maliciously changed 
(Anti-Pharming, which 
cannot be detected by 
SpoofGuard [18]) 
• Difficult to defend against local 
machine Trojan Horse and viruses 
since whole AIWL is installed in local 
PC 
BlackList   
(google  
safe browsing) [15] 
• Block if URL is in 
blacklist 
• Privacy: use hashed 
URL to preserve the 
actual URL queried by 
user 
• Cannot detect zero-day attack and 
when IP is changed 
Content/Heuristic  
(PhishGuard)[19] 
• Identify phishing 
website by submitting 
random credentials in a 
login process before 
submitting actual 
credentials. 
• Can detect phishing 
websites with two 
possibilities: 1)always 
respond with 
authentication failure, 
2)always respond 
with authentication 
access, based on the 
fact that phishing sites 
only store the 
credentials for future 
use and do not verify 
them. 
• Credential theft if unauthorized access 
is replied in case of getting http 401 
response in submission of correct 
credentials after several 401 
responses. e.g. http 401 have two 
meanings: 1) wrong password error, 2) 
website indicates/alerts failed 
authentication in default. 
• Authentication failure alert but “HTTP 
200 OK” response, instead, along with 
a new page in some legitimate 
websites (such as ICICI bank) 
Visual  
Similarity 
[35] 
• Detect phishing by 
finding similarities 
between phishing and 
legitimate websites 
based on text attributes, 
hidden image and 
overall visual 
appearance 
• Integrate visual 
similarity detection 
with open source tool 
AntiPhish [47] to 
overcome the 
problem of reuse of 
legitimate 
credentials warns as 
suspicious in [47] 
• Cannot distinguish if text is replaced 
with image of same appearance 
URL [8] • Statistical [mean, 
median etc.] and lexical 
[title, text content] 
features are used 
• Work regardless of 
webpages in different 
languages. 
• Work well on zero-
hour phishing attack 
• Alexa rank feature gives phishing 
domain in high rank (e.g. 
000webhost.com ) 
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Table 2.2. Comparison of Existing URL-based Phishing Detection 
PAPER PERFORMANCE DATA SET  
ALGORITHMS 
 
ACC TP FP Prec R F1 
SCORE 
AUC DATASET SOURCE DATASET SIZE DATASET 
TYPE 
URL FEATURES YEAR 
LEGITIMATE PHISHING LEGITIMATE PHISHING 
[48]       99.29 VIRUSTOTAL VIRUSTOTAL 16M 0.9M IMBALANCED PRIMARY DOMAIN 
FEATURE, PATH FEATURE, 
FILE EXTENSION FEATURE 
(*3) 
CNN 2017 
[49] 99.09       ALEXA+  
PAYMENT 
GATEWAY+ 
TOP BANKING 
WEBSITE 
PHISHTANK+ 
OPENPHISH 
1600+  
66+  
252 
1528+ 613  NO. OF DOTS, SPECIAL 
SYMBOLS, URL LENGTH, 
SPECIAL WORDS, POSITION 
OF TLD, HTTP COUNT, 
BRAND NAME, DATA URI 
(*8) 
RF 
SVM 
NN 
LR 
NB 
2017 
[50] 98.76   98.60 98.93 98.76 99.91 COMMON 
CRAWL 
PHISHTANK 1M 1M BALANCED PATH LENGTH, URL 
ENTROPY, LENGTH RATIO, 
’@’ AND ’-’ COUNT, 
PUNCTUATION COUNT, 
TLDS COUNT, IP ADDRESS, 
SUSPICIOUS WORDS 
COUNT, EUCLIDEAN 
DISTANCE, KOLMOGOROV-
SMIRNOV STATISTIC (*10) 
RF 
LSTM 
2017 
[51] 95.80       ALEXA+ 
SEARCH 
ENGINE 
PHISHTANK 500+  
500 
1000 BALANCED URL SIZE, NO. OF 
HYPHENS, NO. OF DOTS, 
NO. OF NUMERIC 
CHARACTERS, IP ADDRESS, 
SIMILARITY INDEX 
(LEVENSHTEIN, JARO 
WINKLER, NORMALIZED 
LEVENSHTEIN, LONGEST 
COMMON SUBSEQUENCE, 
Q GRAM, HAMMING) (*6) 
NB 
BAYES 
SVM 
2018 
[52] 95.00        PHISHTANK    IP ADDRESS, REDIRECTION 
OF PAGE USING “//”, 
ADDING PREFIX OR SUFFIX 
SEPARATED BY “-”, 
SUBDOMAIN AND MULTI-
SUBDOMAIN, URLS 
HAVING @ SYMBOL (*6) 
IG 
RANKER 
METHOD 
2018 
[53]  99.70 0.40 99.70 99.70 99.70 1.00 DIGG58.COM+ 
GITHUB 
PHISHTANK+ 
GITHUB 
16516+ 37,667 12483+ 
24,905 
SLIGHTLY 
IMBALANCED 
IP ADDRESS, NO. OF DOTS, 
NO. OF  “/”,  SPECIAL 
CHARACTERS, ABNORMAL 
LENGTH OF DOMAIN, 
CHARACTER 
DISTRIBUTION (*36) 
RF 
MLP 
NB 
LR 
J48 
SVM 
2018 
[54]       70.10-
EBAY 
71.01-
PAYP
AL 
EBAY+  
PAYPAL+  
BANK OF 
AMERICA +  
SORIO ET AL. 
EBAY+ 
PAYPAL+ 
BANK OF 
AMERICA+ 
SORIO  
18800+ 17572+ 
9408+ 82101 
8529+ 9690+ 
4610+ 6562 
IMBALANCED NO. USAGE OF DOMAIN 
NAME, URL LENGTH, 
DOMAIN SEPARATED BY “-
”, MULTIPLE SUBDOMAINS, 
USAGE OF “@” SYMBOL, 
SVMSMOTE 
BSMOTE2 
RMR 
ADASYN 
2018 
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70.10-
BOA 
97.65-
SORIO 
ET AL. NO. OF TLD IN THE PATH, 
NO. OF SUSPICIOUS 
WORDS, NO. OF 
PUNCTUATION SYMBOLS 
USED, DIGITS IN DOMAIN, 
ENTROPY, KULLBACK-
LEIBLER DIVERGENCE, NO. 
OF “-” IN PATH, 
VOWEL/CONSONANT 
RATIO, DIGIT/LETTER 
RATIO, USAGE OF BRAND 
NAMES, LONG 
HOSTNAMES, SHORT 
HOSTNAMES, NO. OF “:” IN 
HOSTNAME (*18) 
[55] 96.89       SEARCH 
ENGINE+ 
COMMON 
CRAWL+  
TWITTER 
STREAM API 
PHISHTANK 456300  FEATURES FROM [11][48] ANN 
LSTM 
2018 
[56] D1: 
99.47 
D2: 
99.92 
       PHISHTANK+ 
OPENPHISH+ 
MALWARE 
DOMAIN 
LIST+ 
MALWARE 
DOMAINS 
DATA SET1: 90101 
DATA SET2: 26000 
  CNN 
CNN-LSTM 
BIGRAM 
2018 
[7] 99.44       ALEXA 
 
PHISHTANK 
+ MALWARE 
DOMAIN 
LIST+ SPAM 
DOMAIN LIST 
JWSPAMSPY 
26041 26041 BALANCED 117 STATIC AND DYNAMIC 
FEATURES 
J48 
SIMPLE CART 
RF 
RT 
ADTREE 
REPTREE 
MAJORITY 
VOTING 
2018 
[8] 97.70 98.30 2.60     ALEXA+  
NETWORK 
SECURITY 
CHALLENGE 
PHISHTANK 3305 2892  IP ADDRESS, SUSPICIOUS 
CHARACTERS, NETWORK 
PROTOCOL, ALEXA 
RANKING, LENGTH OF 
ENTIRE URL, LENGTH OF 
HOSTNAME, LENGTH OF 
MAIN DOMAIN NAME, NO. 
OF DOTS IN HOSTNAME,  
NO. OF DOTS IN URL PATH, 
URL TOKEN COUNT, 
HOSTNAME TOKEN 
COUNT, SEARCH ENGINE 
RESULT (*12) 
KNN 
LR 
RF 
DT 
GBDT 
XGBST 
DF 
2018 
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CHAPTER 3 
METHDOLOGY 
In this section, we first present overview of URL-based detection system in 
section 3.1 and then describe our proposed feature – entropy for Non-Alpha Numeric 
(NAN) characters in section 3.2. Then, we mention about binary classification for two 
classes of legitimate and phishing in our work in section 3.3 and the machine learning 
techniques which we use as building blocks in 3.4. We conclude this section with 
feature engineering and hyperparameter tuning that are used in preprocessing stage and 
classification stage. 
3.1. Our URL-based Detection System 
 
 
Figure 3.1. Our URL-based Detection System 
 
Figure 3.2. shows how URL phishing is performed. When phishers mimic reliable 
sites, users submit credential information to the attackers without knowing the website 
is faked. 
 
 
Figure 3.2. URL-based Phishing 
3.2. Proposed Feature – Entropy  
We know that in URL-based detection, performance greatly depends on the types 
of features and the number of features because we can access URLs alone in detection. 
We use 12 features in total, in which 10 out of 12 are previously used features in various 
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papers called “old features” and 2 of them are our new applied features called “new 
features”. The reason of choosing the features is that accessing to the webpage is not 
required to perform feature extraction. However, our objective is to confirm how 
effective our entropy feature of NAN is. The key idea for our contribution of computing 
entropy on NAN is to find out how they are distributed on each URL. This is because 
previous works [7, 8] extract frequencies of specific special characters such as “-”, “//”, 
“_”, “.” (NAN characters in our work) in each URL, and our hypothesis is that the 
number of times phishers use special characters are greater than that of times legitimate 
websites use.  
Thus, instead of measuring frequencies of specific special characters and 
representing as several features, we compute entropy to measure the frequentist 
probability distribution between phishing and legitimate websites and represent as single 
feature. For example: instead of measuring Number of “.” as a feature F1, Number of “-
“ as feature F2, Number of “@” as F3 and representing a vector for a URL as 
[F1,F2,F3], we compute entropy of NAN characters as feature F1 representing the 
vector as [F1] where F1=entropy(frequentist probability distribution of NAN 
characters). Since the presence of special characters in phishing and legitimate websites 
are different, we assume that measuring their distribution results a precise value for a 
better classification. We use entropy because it is a measure of disorder (as well as a 
measure of purity) and it is computed based on frequentist probability distribution. High 
level of disorder means low level of purity – if probabilities between special characters 
are not much different (i.e. 4/7 and 3/7), it has high entropy or low level of purity. 
Otherwise, low entropy or high purity. 
We define entropy of NAN characters as follows: !"#$%&' = −∑ (,-.%/,-)1-∈3  (3.1) 
,where, 4 = the ith NAN character in T i.e., 6(4) 
T = {list of NAN characters} ,-= the frequentist probability of the ith NAN character  
To be noted, we use logarithmic base 2 in calculation. 
A high entropy is considered a high level of disorder (i.e. low level of purity). For 
example: Assume we have 5 different NAN characters {“-”, “.”, “_”, “@”, “&”} whose 
appearance probabilities are same as 0.2, then we have −∑ (0.2.%/0.2):-;< = (-
2.321928). Note: Entropy is generally measured between 0 and 1, however, depending 
on the number of elements in dataset, entropy can be greater than 1. But, it means the 
same. 
We consider that NAN characters play a huge impact on classification of phishing 
detection. Thus, we use entropy to find out how each NAN characters are equally 
distributed on each URL after feature selection of those characters are performed. 
Entropy feature is applied after important features of NAN characters are selected. We 
consider probability distribution of NAN characters found in each URL, not distribution 
over entire datasets.  
3.3. Machine Learning 
Machine Learning is an automated learning in which we make computers process 
a program itself from past knowledge available without the need of external help. It 
learns the past experience by itself and converts it to knowledge. In machine learning, 
input is the training data while output is the knowledge it learned from the previous 
experience. We need machine learning when the tasks we want to perform are complex 
 
 
 13 
and we need a well-fitted program that adapts to the input which varies in time. We can 
categorize machine learning into supervised and unsupervised learning in general 
although it has other categories such as semi-supervised and reinforcement learning. 
3.3.1. Supervised Learning 
Supervised learning is a learning which already has a ground truth to check if a 
result is correctly predicted. In supervised learning, each training data has its label (i.e. 
ground truth/class) and all of them are fully labelled. Supervised learning can solve two 
problems, which are classification and regression. Regression is used for problems in 
which output values are numerical or continuous, for example, stock price prediction. 
However, classification is applied for prediction in which output values are categorical 
or discrete, for example, spam detection. In phishing detection area, we apply 
classification to analyze if the URL vector belongs to phishing or legitimate and output 
a discrete result. In our case, we apply binary classification, phishing (-1) and 
legitimate(1). 
3.3.1.1. Binary Classification 
Binary classification is also a type of supervised learning. It identifies a given 
data into one of two classes. Binary classification is commonly applied in problems 
such as whether a patient has a certain disease, or if a student passes exam. In our 
research, we apply binary classification since we only consider two labels for the input 
URL: phishing and legitimate. Some of the commonly used methods in binary 
classification are Logistic Regression, random forest (RF), Bayesian (which can be 
naïve bayes NB or gaussian naïve bayes GNB, support vector machine (SVM), Neural 
Networks and Decision Trees. 
3.4. Machine Learning Techniques as Building Blocks 
We first apply three algorithms such as NB, SVM and RF in our research to find 
out which algorithm fits well. To be noted that we use machine learning techniques as 
building blocks. We listed them as follows. 
3.4.1. Naïve Bayes 
Naïve Bayes (NB) is a simple yet effective classifier used in numerous 
applications. In  NB classifier in our case, we define conditional probability of our 
feature vector P(x|y) as follows: ,(' = −1|?) = @(A|B;C<)@D?E' = −1FG@(A|B;<)  (3.2) 
Where,  x = a feature vector 
 y Î {1,-1} = class label of either a  phishing(-1) or legitimate website(1)
 P (x|y) = the conditional probability of a feature vector given its label.  
3.4.2. Support Vector Machine 
Support Vector Machine (SVM) is a discriminative classifier defined by the optimal 
separating hyperplane between labels. SVM outputs an optimal hyperplane by dividing 
a line between class labels in two dimensional space. Here, since we don’t have linearly 
separable training data in the real-world, kernel trick is necessary. It maps non-linearly 
separable data into higher dimensional space, such that, an optimal hyperplane can be 
found to separate samples. In our work, we deploy SVM classifier from sklearn by 
applying our extracted feature vectors with respected class labels (phishing -1 and 
legitimate 1). 
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3.4.3. Random Forest 
Random forests (RF) is built with random attribute selection using bagging. RF 
employ a divide and conquer approach (ensemble mechanism) for improving 
performance. In RF, the mechanism combines various random subsets of trees. The 
overall result is calculated based on the average, or weighted average, of the individual 
results. RF improves the problem of overfitting of the decision trees. We use RF not 
only for classification with hyperparameter tuning but also for feature selection. 
3.5. Feature Selection and Hyperparameter Tuning 
In the feature engineering field of phishing detection, researchers apply several 
features depending on their detection techniques. As our research focuses on URL 
solely, it is crucial to decide which features are applied.  
3.5.1. Feature Selection 
Irrelevant or partially relevant features may bring negative effect on performance 
of a model. The data features which are used to train machine learning models have a 
great influence on the performance. Feature selection is the very first and most important 
step of model designing. Feature selection can reduce overfitting and improve accuracy. 
Thus, we consider feature selection is essential before applying our entropy contribution. 
As for our case, we assume feature selection as identifying negatively affected NAN 
characters on the dataset and removing them before applying entropy of NAN as a 
feature. Thus, we perform selection in order to drop unnecessary NAN characters, which 
have less or no contribution over model’s performance.  
3.5.1.1. Feature Importance 
We perform feature selection from feature importance scores among 21 NAN 
characters, in which our feature vector contains frequencies of each NAN character in a 
URL with its class label. We get feature importance scores for each feature from feature 
importance property of RF model. Since feature importance is an inbuilt class among 
decision tree based classifiers, we use RF Classifier to extract the top 10 NAN characters 
from the dataset. The higher the score is, the more important or relevant the feature is 
towards the output.  
3.5.2. Hyperparameter Tuning with Random Forest 
Grid Search takes in as many hyperparameters as we want. However, we are 
considering n_estimators, bootstrap, cv and criterion. It tries possible combination of the 
hyperparameters with cross-validation we apply. It is a good way to determine the best 
hyperparameters values to use although it is time consuming. Hyperparameter is a 
parameter of the model which is predefined before starting the learning process. 
Although different models have different hyperparameters set, we use RF classifier for 
hyperparameter tuning. 
n_estimators: It specifies the number of trees in the forest of the model. The default 
value for this parameter is 100 in version 0.22. 100 different decision trees will be 
constructed in RF. However, we set n_estimators in range from 100 to 200 with increase 
of 10 in each time, and 300 to 700 with increase of 100 in each time. 
 bootstrap: we specify whether bootstrap samples are used when building trees. It has 
True and False values. 
criterion: It is a function to measure the quality of a split. For Gini impurity, ‘gini’ 
criterion and Information Gain ‘entropy’ are used.  
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cross-validation (CV) : We apply K-Fold cross-validation which is the most common 
method. We set 10 folds CV in our tuning. 
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CHAPTER 4 
DATASETS, FEATURE SELECTION AND EXTRACTION 
In our work, we discuss about the preprocessing of Non-alphanumeric (NAN) 
features. We also work on both balanced and imbalanced dataset. Here, balanced 
dataset means for which class distribution are equal and imbalanced for inequal class 
distribution. To be noted that we consider two classes; phishing and legitimate. Our 
hypothesis in this work is that the number of phishing data cannot be compared to that 
of legitimate websites in the real world, and we cannot guarantee the same effect on 
classification of phishing with balanced and imbalanced dataset. In this section, we 
mention about datasets in section 4.1, and preprocessing and NAN selection in 4.2 and 
4.3. In the last section of chapter 4, we describe feature descriptions and extractions in 
details.  
4.1. Datasets 
In our system, we collect phishing data from PhishTank [57] and legitimate data 
from DMOZ [58] (aka Curl). We use two datasets, which are balanced and imbalanced 
on RF, to find out the best-fitted algorithm among SVM, Gaussian NB and RF without 
adjusting anything. Then, we apply the two datasets along with hyperparameter tuning 
with RF.  
4.1.1. Datasets Nature 
Table 4.1. Datasets Nature 
Dataset Size Type Legitimate Phishing 
D1 5,000 5,000 Balanced 
D2 95,754 10,473 Imbalanced 
 
Table 4.2. Data Sources 
Dataset Source 
Legitimate Phishing 
D1 DMOZ PhishTank 
D2 DMOZ PhishTank 
We collected phishing data from April 6th to April 8th 2019. For imbalanced dataset, the 
ratio of the number of legitimate sites to that of phishing sites is nearly 9:1. We perform 
our experiments on different datasets (balanced and imbalanced) to verify whether the 
performance of the proposed feature depends on the dataset size. Our idea is that in the 
real-world, we cannot expect that the number of legitimate sites and that of phishing 
sites are same. Thus, we also use imbalanced data to verify whether our proposed 
entropy still works on class imbalanced data. We illustrate the nature of  our datasets in 
the Appendix. 
4.2. Validate Active URLs for legitimate sites 
Active check: We collect only active legitimate datasets. We check if they are 
still valid. We assume link is valid if we get HTTP response from requested link. We 
perform validation to ensure that the datasets we work on are up-to-date. As for 
phishing, we apply latest updated URLs as possible. 
4.3. Non-Alpha Numeric (NAN) Character Selection 
NAN character selection: We perform feature selection with its importance according 
to their feature importance. We perform the selection for two times, one for balanced 
dataset D1 and other for imbalanced dataset D2, because later, we compare 
experimental evaluation in both D1 and D2. In both selections, we split the dataset to 
70% train and 30% test then perform the feature selections with training datasets, D1-
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train for balanced and D2-train for imbalanced, respectively. Our hypothesis is that we 
do not know what kind of characters phishers are going to use and we do not want to 
define them randomly. Thus, it is better to use NAN characters selection before we 
apply enctropy calculations for phishing detection. 
Table 4.3. List of NAN Character 
NAN CHARACTER SYMBOL NAN CHARACTER SYMBOL 
HASH # PERCENT % 
DASH - UNDERSCORE _ 
DOLLAR SIGN $ QUESTION ? 
ASTERISK SIGN * COMMA , 
LEFT PARENTHESIS (,[,{ EQUAL = 
RIGHT PARENTHESIS ),],} AMPERSAND & 
SEMICOLON ; TIDE ~ 
COLON : PERIOD . 
APOSTROPHE ‘ PLUS + 
SLASH / AT SIGN @ 
EXCLAMATION !   
4.4. Features Description and Extraction 
We extract feature vectors in order to apply classification. Features can be binary or 
nonbinary values. We describe previously proposed features by various papers as “old 
features”, otherwise, “new features” in section 4.4.2. Previously used features mean 
the features applied by previous papers, not our proposed features. We listed feature 
description in section 4.4.1 and extractions in section 4.4.2.  
4.4.1. Feature Description 
We consider 12 different features in our work described as follows (Table 4.4). 
Table 4.4. Feature Description 
FEATURE FEATURE NAME DESCRIPTION 
F1 IP ADDRESS CHECK IP ADDRESS IN DOMAIN[53,7,8,22] 
F2 EXE  CHECK EXE FILE IN URL[7] 
F3 SENSITIVE WORDS CHECK SENSITIVE WORDS IN URL[53,7] 
F4 // REDIRECT CHECK // IN URL DOMAIN AND PATH[59] 
F5 INTERNAL LINK CHECK INTERNAL LINK (WWW/HTTP) IN URL DOMAIN AND 
PATH[7] 
F6 AGE OF DOMAIN CHECK DOMAIN AGE (>12 MONTHS)[7] 
F7 PORT NUMBER CHECK PORT NUMBER[8] 
F8 - sign COUNT NUMBER OF ‘-‘ SIGN IN URL[7,8] 
F9 @ sign COUNT NUMBER OF ‘@’ SIGN IN URL[7,8] 
F10 . sign COUNT NUMBER OF ‘.’ SIGN IN URL[7,8] 
F11 ENTROPY CALCULATE ENTROPY OF NAN CHARACTERS 
F12 FREE HOST CHECK DOMAIN USING FREE HOST SERVICES 
4.4.2. Feature Extraction 
We extract features according to the following rules. We split features into two 
categories; old features and new features. 
4.4.2.1. Old Features 
F1 – IP address (binary): check if URL contains an IP address. Return -1 if found, 
otherwise, return 1. Our hypothesis is that phishers use IP address instead of domain 
name to direct users to a phishing page to confuse users since they do not know where 
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the current link with IP address belongs to when they click it. (for example, 
http://67.205.147.248/oft/index.php?produto=722415036). 
F2 – exe (binary): check if URL contains exe file. Return -1 if found, otherwise, return 
1. Hypothesis is that phishers use exe files to run malware on background process. 
F3 – sensitive word (binary): check if URL contains sensitive words[50] such as 
“confirm”, “account”, “banking”, “secure”, “login”, “signin” etc. Return -1 if found, 
otherwise, return 1. Hypothesis is that most of the phishers use those keywords to lure 
victims as if the site is legitimate. 
F4 - // redirect (binary): check if a path of URL contains “//” to redirect users to 
phishing page. Return -1 if found, otherwise, return 1. Hypothesis is that “//” is mainly 
used for redirection by ignoring the left side of URL. (for example, 
http://redirect.company.com/http://externalsite.com/page) 
F5 – internal link (binary): check if a path of URL contains another link. Return -1 if 
found, otherwise, return 1. Hypothesis is that phishers add internal URL in a main URL. 
(for example,http://www.linkebuy.com.br/linkebuy/parceiro?protocol=http&url=ww 
w.google.com) 
F6 – age of domain (binary): check if the age of domain is less than 12 months. We 
check ‘whois’ property of the domain and get the creation date of the domain if we can 
successfully access to that domain. We check the creation date of the domain is less 
than 12 months of the current accessed date.  Return -1 if true, otherwise 1. Hypothesis 
is that phishing links do not exist for a long time and phishers mostly use newly created 
links. 
F7 – port number (nonbinary): check which port number is used. If it is 443 (HTTPS), 
then return 1. If 80 (HTTP), then 0, otherwise -1. Hypothesis is that previously phishers 
rarely use HTTPS. However, in 2017 PhishLab report[5], they started using HTTPS. 
Thus, we differentiate HTTPS with others. 
F8 – ‘-‘ dash count (nonbinary) : count frequencies of ‘-‘ sign in a URL. Return 
frequencies of ‘-‘ in each URL. Hypothesis is that phishers mimic as legitimate websites 
by adding ‘-‘ in URL. 
F9 – ‘@’ at count (nonbinary) : count frequencies of ‘@’ sign in a URL. Return 
frequencies of ‘@’ in each URL. Hypothesis is that when we analyze our phishing 
datasets, phishers more often use ‘@’ in URL, especially in URL query value than 
legitimate websites. ( for example, http://shunmas.com/sj/index.php?email=2@2.com). 
F10 – ‘.’ Dot count (nonbinary) : count frequencies of ‘.’ Sign in a URL. Return 
frequencies of ‘.’ in each URL. Hypothesis is that phishers either use more sub domains 
than legitimate websites, or unnecessary ‘.’ in URL path. (for example, 
https://www.ssproduction.com.pk/spages/verify.php?ga=2.38170595.17086121.15510
95253-653443608.1551095253&mail=laurent@tacer.biz..). 
4.4.2.2. New Features 
F11 – entropy of NAN characters (nonbinary): Based on NAN character selection, we 
perform entropy computation. It is calculated per each URL. Hypothesis is that NAN 
characters are crucial in phishing detection since phishers use them to generate new 
links. Moreover, we use entropy to know how those NAN characters are distributed 
over each URL link.  
F12 – free host (binary): check if URL uses free hosting domain (for example : 
000webhost.com is mostly found in our phishing datasets). We surveyed manually 
about free hosting domain present in our phishing datasets and found several phishing 
domains with 000webhostapp.com. Any user can create a website with a domain name 
of 000webhostapp.com after signing up at free hosting service 000webhost.com.  We 
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use free hosting services surveyed in [60] which are used by phishers, in 2012. 
Although it is not updated anymore, 000webhost is still popular and currently used 
among phishers. Hypothesis is that phishers mainly use free hosting URLs. Hosting 
service, such as 000webhost, ranks high in Alexa.com, however, they are mostly used 
by phishers. Thus, we target URLs from free hosting. Return -1 if true, otherwise, return 
1.  
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CHAPTER 5 
EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION AND SUMMARY 
We first describe evaluation metrics in section 5.1, and later we explain about 
feature selection in section 5.2. Section 5.3 and 5.4 present about our experimental 
evaluation results in details. Finally, we provide summary of our work and  discussion 
in section 5.5. 
5.1. Evaluation Metrics 
Here, N represents the total number of websites and F represents the number of 
phishing websites and L represents the number of legitimate websites. N is the number 
of websites. H → H = Phishing websites are correctly classified as phishing websites H → J = Phishing websites are incorrectly classified as legitimate websites J → J = Legitimate websites are correctly classified as legitimate websites J → H = Legitimate websites are incorrectly classified as phishing websites KL→L = the number of correctly classified phishing websites KL→M = the number of phishing websites that are incorrectly classified as 
legitimate websites KM→M= the number of correctly classified legitimate websites KM→L  = the number of legitimate websites that are incorrectly classified as 
phishing websites KL = 	KL→L +	KL→M	= the total number of phishing websites KM = 	KM→M +	KM→L = the total number of phishing websites KP = 	KM→M + KM→L + KL→L + KL→M	= the total number of websites  
• True positive rate (TPR): the ratio of the number of correctly classified phishing 
websites (KL→L) to the total number of phishing attacks (KL→L + KL→M) as shown 
in Equation(5.1). 
• False positive rate (FPR): the ratio of the number of legitimate websites that are 
incorrectly detected as phishing attacks (KM→L) to the total number of all existing 
legitimate websites (KM→M + KM→L) as shown in Equation (5.2). 
• True negative rate (TNR): the ratio of the number of correctly classified 
legitimate websites (KM→M) to the total number of legitimate websites (KM→M +KM→L) as shown in Equation (5.3). 
• False negative rate (FNR): the ratio of the number of phishing websites that are 
incorrectly classified as legitimate (KL→M ) to the total number of phishing 
websites (KL→L + KL→M) as shown in Equation (5.4). 
• Precision (Prec): the ratio of correctly detected phishing websites (KL→L) to the 
total number of websites detected as phishing (KM→L + KL→L) as shown in (5.5). 
• Recall (R): equivalent to TP rate as shown in Equation (5.6). 
• Accuracy (ACC): the ratio of the sum of correctly classified phishing and 
legitimate websites (KM→M + KL→L ) to the total number of websites (KM→M +KM→L + KL→L + KL→M). as shown in Equation (5.7). 6,Q = RS→SRS→SGRS→T (5.1) 
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H,Q = RT→SRT→TGRT→S (5.2) 6KQ = RT→TRT→TGRT→S (5.3) HKQ = RS→TRS→SGRS→T (5.4) , = RS→SRT→SGRS→S (5.5) Q = 6,R (5.6) UVV = RT→TGRS→SRT→TGRT→SGRS→SGRS→T (5.7) 
5.2. Feature Selection 
We perform feature selection for two times using feature importance on Random 
Forest (RF).On both datasets, we extract 21 NAN characters from each URL if 
presence. Then, we perform feature selection based on feature importance. Figure 5.1 
shows the importance of features. We then select the top 10 features as an input to 
entropy. After feature selection of NAN, we input top 10 features to compute entropy 
scores of a URL in feature extraction. 
 
 
Figure 5.1. Feature Importance Score 
 
5.3. Experiment with Balanced and Imbalanced Datasets 
After we selected NAN characters as mentioned above, we extract the 12 features 
described in Table 4.4. Then, we first perform classifications with three classifiers: 
Gaussian naïve bayes (GNB), support vector machine (SVM) and RF without adjusting 
any parameters to choose the best fit model. In Table 5.1, we show previous features 
(Prev) along with our proposed feature (entropy of NAN – Entropy). Note that those 
previous features are applied in different works, not just in a single one. We compare 
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experimental evaluation with or without entropy. Precision, recall, ACC and 
ROC_AUC are presented in percentage (%). RF outperforms two other classifiers on 
both balanced and imbalanced datasets with 89.43% and 72.64% of ROC_AUC score 
(Receiver Operating Characteristics) respectively. We measure the ROC_AUC score 
instead of accuracy since the class of highly imbalanced data tends to be biased. 
Table 5.1. Evaluation Results for three Classifiers on balanced and imbalanced 
datasets using previous and entropy features 
Classifier Datasets Features Prec R TPR FPR FNR TNR ACC ROC _AUC 
SVM Imbalanced Prev+Entropy 0.94 0.67 0.66  0.34  0.33  0.66  93.08 66.28 Balanced 0.80 0.80 0.80  0.20  0.20  0.80  79.63 79.56 
GNB Imbalanced Prev+Entropy 0.95 0.64 0.64  0.36  0.36  0.64  92.74 64.20 Balanced 0.81 0.72 0.72  0.28  0.28  0.72  71.33 71.91 
RF Imbalanced Prev+Entropy 0.92 0.73 0.73  0.27  0.27  0.73  94.02 72.64 Balanced 0.89 0.89 0.89  0.11  0.11  0.89  89.41 89.43 
Table 5.2. Comparison of Without (Prev) and With (Prev+Entropy) entropy 
Classifier Datasets Features Prec R TPR FPR FNR TNR ACC ROC _AUC 
SVM 
Imbalanced Prev+Entropy 0.94 0.66 0.66  0.34  0.33  0.66  93.08 66.28 Prev 0.94 0.65 0.65 0.34 0.34 0.65 92.98 65.29 
Balanced Prev+Entropy 0.80 0.80 0.80  0.20  0.20  0.80  79.63 79.56 Prev 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.20 0.20 0.80 79.50 79.75 
GNB 
Imbalanced Prev+Entropy 0.95 0.64 0.64  0.36  0.36  0.64  92.74 64.20 Prev 0.94 0.64 0.64 0.36 0.36 0.64 92.65 64.18 
Balanced Prev+Entropy 0.81 0.72 0.72  0.28  0.28  0.72  71.33 71.91 Prev 0.82 0.71 0.71 0.29 0.29 0.71 72.00 71.30 
RF 
Imbalanced Prev+Entropy 0.92 0.73 0.73  0.27  0.27  0.73  94.02 72.64 Prev 0.90 0.66 0.66 0.34 0.34 0.66 93.22 66.31 
Balanced Prev+Entropy 0.89 0.89 0.89  0.11  0.11  0.89  89.41 89.43 Prev 0.82 0.80 0.80 0.11 0.11 0.89 79.50 79.49 
Then we compare the evaluation results of ROC_AUC with and without our 
proposed entropy feature in Table 5.2. As RF outperforms the two other classifiers, we 
focus only on RF for more hyperparameter tuning. To be noted that, our results are 
measured based on testing datasets of 10-fold cross validation. In the above Table 5.2, 
we measured experimental evaluations based on 10-fold cross validations without using 
hyperparameter tuning to select a better model. However, in the following section 5.4, 
we perfume hypter-parameter tuning with RF. 
5.4. Comparison between Previous and Current Evaluations with 
Hyperparameter Tuning 
As for hyperparameter tuning, we tune parameters on RF as described below. We 
performed GridSearchCV for parameter tuning to generate a better outcome. 
GridSearchCV evaluates all combinations we define along with cross validation. 
param_grid = {‘n_estimators’: 
[100,110,120,130,140,150,160,170,180,190,200,300,400,500,600,700],  
‘criterion’: [‘gini’, ‘entropy’],  
‘bootstrap’: [true, false] } 
----------------------------------- 
Number of combinations = 16*2*2 = 64 
CV = 10-Fold 
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We show the comparison results of with and without proposed entropy of NAN 
characters in Table 5.3.  To note that, we refit Grid Search with ROC_AUC for a fair 
classification to avoid bias. The evaluation results mentioned in the table are measured 
only for testing datasets after 10-fold cross validation. The following Figure 5.2 shows 
our experimental results after hyperparameter tuning. 
Pseudo Code :  
clf = RandomForestClassifier() 
skf = StratifiedKFold(n_splits=10) 
param_grid =  
{‘n_estimators’: 
[100,110,120,130,140,150,160,170,180,190,200,300,400,500,600,700],  
‘criterion’: [‘gini’, ‘entropy’],  
‘bootstrap’: [true, false] } 
grid_search = GridSearchCV(clf, param_grid, scoring=scorers, 
refit=refit_score,cv=skf, return_train_score=true, n_jobs=-1) 
 
 
Figure 5.2.  Experimental Evaluation of ROC_AUC  on balanced and imbalanced 
datasets 
 
In GridSearchCV, all the combinations we defined are performed with 10-fold 
cross validation on RF classifier. We have 10 splits (split0-split9) of testing data per 
each combination (64 in total) and we measure mean ROC_AUC, F1, ACC of all the 
splits. Thus, our final experimental evaluation is achieved by the best mean test scores 
of all the combinations.  
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Table 5.3. Comparison between Previous and Current Evaluations after Hyperparameter Tuning 
Dataset Features 
Hyper Parameter Tuning (RF) 
Scorers Refit By 
Best  
Parameter Prec* R* TPR* FPR* FNR* TNR* ACC* 
ROC 
_AUC* F1* n_estimator criterion boot strap 
Balanced 
Prev+Entropy 
[100,110,120,130, 
140,150,160,170, 
180,190,200,300, 
400,500,600,700] 
[‘gini’,  
‘entropy’
] 
[True,  
False] 
Precision 
Recall 
ACC 
ROC_AUC 
F1 
ROC_ 
AUC 
‘bootstrap’: True, 
 ‘criterion’: 
‘entropy’,  
‘n_estimators’: 
500 
0.90 0.90 0.90 0.10 0.10  0.90  89.82 96.20 89.82 
Prev 
‘bootstrap’: True, 
 ‘criterion’: 
‘gini’,  
‘n_estimators’: 
170 
0.83 0.80 0.81 0.19 0.19  0.81 80.68 87.51 80.28 
Imbalanced 
Prev+Entropy 
‘bootstrap’: True,  
‘criterion’: ‘gini’,  
‘n_estimators’: 
600 
0.94 0.94 0.74 0.26 0.26  0.74  94.05 89.31 93.20 
Prev 
‘bootstrap’: True,  
‘criterion’: ‘gini’,  
‘n_estimators’: 
160 
0.93 0.93 0.66  0.35  0.35  0.66  92.94 84.31 91.36 
As we mentioned before, our ROC_AUC score shows better performance with parameter tuning and results in ROC_AUC score of 89.31% with our 
contributed feature ‘entropy’ while the performance without entropy results 84.31% on imbalanced datasets. Moreover, it also works well on balanced datasets 
generating 96.20% of ROC_AUC with entropy winning over 87.51% without it. 
*Scorings are measured by mean value i.e. mean_test_precision, mean_test_recall and so on because we performed 10-fold cross validation and we showed our 
results based on test set. 
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5.5. Comparison between Feature Sets based on Frequency 
Probability and Entropy  
We also measure probability distribution of frequencies of special characters as 
separate features without using Entropy. As for the experiment, we the same 
hyperparameter tuning mentioned in Table 5.3. Then, we compare evaluation result of 
ROC_AUC with entropy of NAN shown in the Table 5.4. 
Table 5.4. Comparison between Feature Set1 (Percentage of NAN) and Feature Set2 
(Entropy of NAN) 
Dataset Name Features No of  
Features 
ROC 
_AUC 
Time  
(seconds) 
Time  
difference  
(seconds) 
Imbalanced  
D2 
Feature Set 
FS1 
IP address, exe, sensitive word,  
'//' redirect, internal link,  
age of domain, port number,  
free hosting 
Percentage of ('#' count, '@' count, 
 '-' count, '.' count, '$' count, '*' count,  
'[' count, '(' count,'{' count, ']' count,  
'}' count, ')' count, '+' count, ';' count, 
 '~' count, ':' count, ''' count, '/' count,  
'%' count, '?' count, ',' count, '=' count, 
 '&' count, '!' count, '_' count),  
total nan count 
34 90.55 4870 
1293 
Feature Set 
FS2 
IP address, exe, sensitive word,  
'//' redirect, internal link,  
age of domain, port number, 
'-' count, '@' count, '.' count 
Entropy (nan), free hosting 
12 89.31 3577 
Balanced  
D1 
Feature Set 
FS1 
IP address, exe, sensitive word,  
'//' redirect, internal link,  
age of domain, port number,  
free hosting 
Percentage of ('#' count, '@' count, 
 '-' count, '.' count, '$' count, '*' count,  
'[' count, '(' count,'{' count, ']' count,  
'}' count, ')' count, '+' count, ';' count, 
 '~' count, ':' count, ''' count, '/' count,  
'%' count, '?' count, ',' count, '=' count, 
 '&' count, '!' count, '_' count),  
total nan count 
34 96.2 381 
115 
Feature Set 
FS2 
IP address, exe, sensitive word,  
'//' redirect, internal link,  
age of domain, port number, 
'-' count, '@' count, '.' count 
Entropy (nan), free hosting 
12 96.2 266 
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To compare with our proposed entropy of NAN characters, we first measure 
percentage of individual 25 NAN characters and total NAN count. We represent them 
as 26 features. And we combine them with other 8 features. Thus, we get 34 features 
in total, called as FS1. In FS2, we have a total of 12 features including entropy. Our 
experiments show that ROC_AUC results are nearly the same becuase entropy is also 
based on the frequentist probability distribution between phishing and legitimate 
websites. We achieved 90.55% of ROC_AUC for FS1 on imbalanced dataset 
compared to 89.31% of ROC_AUC with FS2. 
However, when we measure processing time of individual feature set on 
Random Forest model fitting using hyperparameter tuning on imbalanced dataset, FS2 
is 1293 seconds (~21 mins) faster than FS1. On balanced dataset, although we achieve 
same 96.2% of ROC_AUC for FS1 and FS2, FS2 performed 115 seconds (~2 mins) 
faster than FS1. 
5.6. Summary and Discussion 
In our research, we observed from perspectives; (i) dataset perspective, and (ii) 
feature perspective. 
From the dataset perspective, we performed the detection on balanced and 
imbalanced data, in which the majority of data is legitimate sites. Our assumption is 
that in the real-world, we cannot expect the same or not even close amount of phishing 
datasets as legitimate ones. Thus, we want to figure out if it works well on imbalanced 
datasets. 
From the feature perspective, we contributed entropy feature for distribution of 
NAN characters in a URL, which makes our classification have high performance in 
terms of accuracy. 
In addition to these perspectives, we also test on three different classifiers and 
later perform parameter tuning for a better and robust system. We confirm that with 
96.20% of ROC_AUC on balanced and 89.31% on imbalanced datasets, outperforming 
87.51% and 84.31% without entropy features respectively.  
However, we still have a problem of high FPR. From the feature perspective, we 
use DMOZ for legitimate dataset, in which, as for the number of subdomains, legitimate 
websites have fewer or no information at all, while phishing sites do. It makes it difficult 
to retrieve similar patterns of legitimate URLs, giving high FPR. To address this, we 
believe it is better to target domain name-based features–instead of entire URL–to 
extract characteristics of domain name and current page content. 
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSIONS 
Cyber phishing is a theft of personal information in which phishers mimic a 
legitimate website so that users surrender sensitive information. Phishers lure users, as 
if they are reliable, to access information to break into the victims’ system. Phishing 
detection becomes a crucial research area as the number of phishing attacks grows along 
with e-commerce and internet transactions. In our research, we focus on URL (Uniform 
Resource Locator) -based phishing detection techniques testing our proposed feature’s 
performance on balanced and imbalanced datasets. We consider the URL to be a 
significant criterium to prevent the attacks because of the fact that phishers creating 
fake websites with less information as possible. To overcome problem of retrieving no 
or less information of a webpage for detection, URL-based approach is a solution. 
Because we consider that NAN characters distribution highly impact on phishing URLs, 
we target our proposed feature – entropy of NAN in our work.  
In our work, we performed feature selection of NAN. Our contribution is to 
propose a new entropy feature for NAN characters and compare with the previously 
used features. We confirmed that our proposed feature outperforms previous features 
and we also measured performance based on ROC_AUC score for a more robust 
phishing detection system and our work achieved ROC_AUC score of 89.31% and 
96.20% on imbalanced and balanced datasets respectively.  
Since attackers always come up with various techniques, detection has become a 
primary concern of developers. Only with less information of phishing webpage, we 
focus on URL-based detection. We have a problem of high FPR over 20% since the 
number of features we used are insufficient. However, our objective is to improve 
performance if our proposed feature is applied on any URL-based detection system 
combined with other features. Thus, we performed comparison to show how evaluation 
changed. We hope that applying our proposed feature brings a small help in any URL-
based detection techniques for a better detection system.  
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APPENDIX 
• Dataset Nature 
We gather legitimate data from DMOZ repository and extract maximum two resource 
URLs from each Topic. Then, we validate and apply active URLs only on our 
system. 
 
 
Figure A.1. Xml file sample of legitimate dataset 
 
The following figure is the sample dataset that we collected from PhishTank. We gather 
currently reported phishing URLs to make sure its activity. 
 
 
Figure A.2. Csv file sample of phishing dataset 
 
• Entropy  
Let’s consider non_alphanumeric_characters={’.’ , ’@’ , ’$’ , ’-’}. 
If the distribution of all elements is similar, its entropy is ~1.0  (can be greater than 1 
depending on the number of elements in the datasets)(high entropy=low purity). 
Example 1: http://setting444545page-16mb.com  
(Ignore red part ‘http://’ or ‘www.’) 
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No of NAN characters : 2 in total (‘-‘ = 1 and ‘.’ = 1) !"#$%&' = −(0.5.%/0.5 + 0.5.%/0.5) = 1 
 
Example 2: http://setting444545page.main1.16mb.com  
(Ignore red part ‘http://’ or ‘www.’) 
No of NAN characters : 3 in total (‘.‘ = 3) 
 
(probability = 3/3=1.0) !"#$%&' = −1.%/1 = 0 
If entropy = 0.0, it is low entropy i.e. high purity. 
 
